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COMMENTS
JOINT ENTERPRISE AND AGENCY BETWEEN
OCCUPANTS OF AUTOMOBILES - IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION

When a driver and passenger are occupying a private automobile
involved in an accident with another vehicle, and a law suit develops
between the passenger and the third party, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court may impute the driver's negligence to his passenger by finding that the two were engaged in a joint enterprise or that the driver
was acting as the passenger's agent. This may result in either barring the passenger's recovery as plaintiff against the third party or
making him vicariously liable as defendant.
Until 19211 under the doctrine of Prideaux v. City of Mineral
Point,2 the Wisconsin Court automatically imputed the negligence of
the driver to his passenger in barring recovery by the passenger as
3
plaintiff in suits against third parties.
In 1921, in the case of Reiter v.Grober,4 an attempt was made to
use the doctrine to hold a passenger vicariously liable as a defendant
in a suit brought by a third party. The Wisconsin Court refused an
extension of the doctrine and made a distinction between a situation
where a pasesnger trusts his safety to his driver to such an extent that
the driver's contributory negligence becomes his own as plaintiff, and
a willingness on his part to become responsible to all others for his
driver's negligence. This would result in the passenger insuring all
third persons against his driver's negligence 5 and becoming strictly
liable therefore.
The extension was refused, and the Prideaux case was overruled,
to bring Wisconsin into the majority fold which imputes the negligence of the driver to the passenger only in specific instances.6 The
Court stated:
1 Puhr

v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 171 Wis. 154, 176 N.W. 767 (1920), was the
last Wisconsin decision to automatically impute the driver's negligence to his
passenger.
243 Wis. 513 (1878).

3 This

was the minority rule in the United States which originated as a historical outgrowth of the Roman Law doctrine of identification; the English
case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849), was the
leading common-law case enumerating the principle. See Morris, Motor Ve-

hicles-Iputed Negligence-The Doctrine of Principal and Agent as Applied
to Driver-PassengerRelations-Liability and Defense Contrasted, 40 Wis. L.
Rev. 135.
4173 WVis. 493, 181 N.W. 739 (1921).
- Id. at 495, 181 N.W. at 740.
6 5 A.si. JUR., Automobiles § 494 (1939) : "Generally, negligence of the driver of
an automobile is imputable to a passenger only where the driver is the agent
or servant of the passenger at the time of the negligent act and the act is
committed in the scope of the agent's or servant's employment, or when the

1957]

COMMENTS

"Only so much of the Prideaux case is overruled as imputes
the negligence of the driver to an occupant in a private"conveyance who has no control over the driver; is not engaged in a
joint undertaking with him; is guilty of no negligence himself; and stands,in no other relation to him requiring his negligence to be imputed to the occupant. ' 7
The Court declined to discuss under what facts and circumstances
the passenger would be held to be engaged in a joint undertaking with
the driver or stand in such other relation to him so as to require the
imputation of negligence of the driver.
The present status of the law requires an analysis of the doctrine ot
joint enterprise and its relation to the law of agency. The pertinent
Wisconsin decisions discussing both joint enterprise and agency will
be classified in order to trace the development of the law since the
Reiter case. Emphasis will be placed on the particular facts and circumstances in which the Wisconsin Court has imputed negligence between
automobile occupants so that a comparison can be made of the elements required by the Courts for the establishment of both relationships.
I. MEANING OF TERMS
The doctrine of joint enterprise is one of the most confused areas
of tort law; much of the confusion arises from the lack of adequate
definitions. The courts talk of joint enterprise, joint adventure, joint
venture, mutual agency, etc., without any clear differentiation in
meaning. While the results reached in the cases may be correlated and
conclusions arrived at, it is impossible to reconcile the language used
by the courts." These relationships should be distinguished for an adequate understanding of the doctrine of joint enterprise: principal and
agent; master and servant; partnership and joint adventure.
A. AGENCY:
The Restatement defines agency as:
" ... the relationship which results from the manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on
his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other
so to act."
The relationship of master-servant is a species of the relationship
of principal-agent.' 0 The importance of distinguishing the two is that
ordinarily a principal is not liable for the torts of his agents who are
not servants," while a master is liable for the torts of his servants
driver and passenger are business partners or engaged in a joint enterprise
and the operation of the vehicle is in furtherance of the business."
7 173 Wis. at 498, 181 N.W. at 740.
s Rollison, The Joint Enterprise It The Law of Imputed Negligence, 6 NOTRE
DAmE LAW. 172, at 187 (1930-31).
9
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 1 (1933).
1l Id. at §2, comment a.
2" Id. at §250.
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who are acting within the scope of their authority or employment.1 2
The two relations are to be identified to the extent that a master has
a right to control the detailed or physical movement of the servant in
the performance of the service,' 3 while an agent who is not a servant,
although rendering service to the principal, and subject to his right of
control,'14 does retain control over the manner of performance.' 5 The
agent represents the principal and acts in his place while the servant
simply acts for the principal and usually according to his direction
without discretion. 6 It has been stated that the term servant is used
only to distinguish a group of persons for whose physical conduct the
master is responsible to third persons ;1" and that, other than this,
statements applicable to principal and agent are generally applicable
to master and servant.'8
In most of the automobile cases where agency is alleged so as to
impute negligence between the occupants, and there is no relationship
of employer-employee so as to make the agency one of master and
servant, the usual elements must be present, to wit: the alleged agent
must be acting on behalf of the owner, and, he must be subject to his
control. 19

Generally, the negligence of a servant is not to be imputed to the
master automatically upon the finding of the relationship but depends
upon whether the act is done within the scope of his employment, 0
and the negligence of agents who are not servants is not ordinarily imputed to the principal.2 A contrary result is reached in automobile
cases; if the court reaches the conclusion that an agency does exist between a driver and its occupant, the above distinctions are not attempted and negligence is imputed automatically.
It is to be noted that the words, "master-servant," connote a relationship of employment, 2 while the broader category of principalagent, while usually supported by a consideration, need not be, and
can be gratuitous." This appears to be the pivot upon which the use

of the terms, principal-agent or master-servant, depends. If the neces24
sary benefit and the right to control the physical movements is found,'
12 Id. at §§219 & 228; Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if,
but only if: a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform, b) it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits, and c) it is actuated
at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.
13 Id. at §220, comment a.
14Id. at §14.
1Id. at §220, comment c.
I62 AM. Jua., Agency §7 (1939).
-7RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §2, comment b (1933).
Is Id. at comment a.
19 See note 9 supra.
20 See note 12 supra.
21 See note 11 supra.
"2Nardone, Doctrine of Imputed Negligence, 33 B. U. L. REV. 90, at 94 (1953).
23RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §16 (1933).
2 See note 9 supra.
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which of the terms will be used depends upon whether consideration
is present or not.
Contrary to the general rule,25 once the relationship is found, the
negligence of the agent, using the term in the broad sense, is imputed
without any discussion of whether the act is within the scope of his
authority. Automobile cases seem to be an exception to this requirement, or at least a modification. Perhaps the lack of any discussion
of the question can be explained in the fact that the act of driving the
automobile by the agent is the only conduct of the agent ever under consideration; and once the agency relationship is established between
driver and passenger the authority of the driver to act for the passenger
in driving the car is also found. 26 Any question of scope of authority
would be superfluous since authority of the agent would arise upon
the finding of the agency.
B.

PARTNERSHIP:

A partnership is defined by the Uniform Partnership Act as an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit.2 - The determination of when a partnership exists is beyond the scope of this paper, 28 but once this business relationship is
established an agency then arises between its members making each
partner liable for the tortious acts of the other partners within the
29
scope of the partnership business.
If one partner is negligent in operating a vehicle and the vehicle is
being used for a purpose within the scope of the partnership, 30 the
tortfeasor's partners would be liable on the theory of a mutual
agency arising from the establishment of the partnership.
C. JOINT ADVENTURE:

The terms joint venture, joint adventure and joint enterprise are
all used synonomously, 31 but joint adventure is the term most often
used to describe a business relationship similar to a partnership. A
joint adventure is defined as:
..... a special combination of two or more persons where,
in some specific venture, a profit is jointly 3sought
without any
2
actual partnership or corporate designation."
While a joint adventure is not identical with a partnership it is
so similar that the rights between the joint adventurers are governed
25
See note 12 supra.
26

RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §7 (1933).
27 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §6; Wis Stats. §123.03 (1955).
28 See id. at §7; Wis. STATS. §123.04 (1955) for rules to apply in determining

when a partnership exists.
2 Id. at §9(1) ; Wis. STATS. §123.06(1)
30 See note 22 supra, at 96.

(1955).

3148 C.J.S., Joint Adventures §§1, 13 (1947).
32
Annot, 63 A.L.R. 910 (1929).
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esesntially by the same rules that are applicable to partnerships. 33 Generally, the main distinction between a joint adventure and a partnership is that the former relates to a single transaction while the latter
relates to a general business of a particular kind. 34 The Wisconsin Suppreme Court has said that a joint adventure is in the nature of a partnership, but more limited and confined in its scope.35 The courts, however, have not established any fixed or certain boundaries in determining when a joint adventure exists, but decide each case according
3
to its facts. 1
While the rights and liabilities of joint adventures are very similar
to those of a partnership it is generally understood that they are not
identical therewith. 37 Like a partnership however, a mutual relationship of principal-agent arises from a joint adventure,38 and since a
mutual agency exists, each has the right of control over the other ;39 it
follows that each joint adventurer may be liable for the negligence
of his associate if the negligent conduct is within the scope of the
40
joint undertaking.
It should be noted that the nature of the joint adventure or joint
venture is strictly a business relationship entered into for the realization of profit."' Such a relationship cannot exist unless this element
is present.
Liability for negligent conduct of one joint adventurer for the tortious acts of his associates is based on the fact that the conduct took
place during a time when the tortfeasor was acting within the scope
of the undertaking. This is analogous to the principles applicable to
partnership and agency, 42 and it is to be remembered that a principal
is not liable for tortious acts of his agent unless they took place within
the scope of his employment. 43 To impute negligence between occupants of automobiles on the theory of agency arising from a joint adventure, the trip must be a part of the joint adventure itself, so as to
make the driver's conduct within the scope of the undertaking. 44 If the
33 Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1956 (1927).
1060.
v. Kern, 184 Wis. 266, 199 N.W. 77 (1924).
386The elements necessary to establish the relation are: 1) intent of the parties;
2) a contract either express or inferred; 3) each must combine their property,
money, efforts, skill or knowledge in some common undertaking-there must
be some contribution by each co-adventurer of something promotive of the
enterprise; 4) a joint proprietary interest and a mutual right of control over
the subject matter of the enterprise or over the property engaged therein;
5) an agreement, express or implied for the sharing of profits: See 30
Am. Jum., Joint Adventures §§8-12 (1940).
37 Id. at §5.
38
Annot., 80 A.L.R. 314 (1932).
39 See note 31 supra, §5c.
40 Id. at §14e.
41 See note 32 supra.
42 See note 31 supra, at §14a.
43 See note 12 supra.
44 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §491, comment e (1934).
34 Id. at
35 Barry
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trip has no relation to the purpose of the joint adventure and is no
part of it, then negligence should not be imputed to his associates. 4
D. JOINT ENTERPRISE:
Much confusion could be spared if the term joint enterprise would
not be used as a synonym for the term joint adventure discussed in
the preceeding section. Some authorities have suggested using the
term joint enterprise strictly for the automobile cases of a non-business
nature. 46 The Wisconsin Court, unfortunately, uses joint enterprise
interchangeably with joint adventure in discussing automobile cases.
This causes confusion for the reader who tries to reconcile the definition of a business joint adventure with the Court's findings in a nonbusiness automobile case.
There seems to be little relation between the factual elements necessary to the establishment of a business joint adventure and an automobile joint enterprise, but the intermingling of the terminology seems
to be too established by precedent ever to be changed. The adoption of
a new term such as "automobile venture," for example, in lieu of the
old terms of joint adventure and joint enterprise, in the relatively
new non-commercial situations would bring a welcome definiteness
to an area of the law marred by flagrant inconsistencies.
Although joint enterprise is also used to describe business joint
adventures, it does seem to be used most often in the automobile nonbusiness cases and it will be used in this sense throughout this article.
The rules for finding a joint enterprise as stated by the authorities are clear, in the abstract. The difficulty comes when they are applied by the various courts, and in the language used. The test of
whether two occupants are engaged in a joint enterprise is stated as
follows:
"In order to constitute a joint enterprise so that the negligence of the driver of an automobile may be imputed to an occupant of the car, it is generally held that there must be a common purpose and a community of interest in the object of the enterprise and an equal right to direct47 and control the conduct of
each other with respect thereto."
Similar to a joint adventure, once the relationship is established
a mutual agency arises between the members of the enterprise. Like
the relationship of agency as applied in automobile cases, 48 there is no
question of scope of authority or employment in determining whether
45 See Schleicker v. Krier, 218 Wis. 376. 261 N.V. 413 (1935), where a collision
occurred when a tenant farmer and son-in-law of the owner of the farm
was driving his father-in-law's car to the store to purchase groceries. Negligence of the son-in-law was not imputed because a joint adventure was held
not to exist between the two.
46 See note 22 supra, at 98; PRossER, HoiuUoos ON ToRTs 363 (2d ed. 1955).
47 5 Am. Jur, Automobiles §501 (1936).
4S See note 26 supra.
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negligence should be imputed, but once the relation is found to exist
such a step is automatically taken.
Although the doctrine of joint enterprise is commonly said to rest
upon the relationship of agency of one for the other,49 one writer has
said that it is not exactly a true agency for if an actual agency did
exist there would be no need to resort to any other theory than respondeat superior to obtain the desired result.50 Perhaps, however, joint
enterprise can be classed as a species of agency, like master-servant.
The two main elements of a joint enterprise are a common purpose
and a mutual right of control. 1 The basic elements for the establish52
ment of an agency are benefit to the principal and a right of control.
It is quite rare when two persons in an automobile cannot be found
to have a common purpose in the trip. Once a common purpose is esta'blished, it is also established that the trip is a benefit to each of the occupants. A right of control is common to the creation of both agency
and joint enterprise. 53 Joint enterprise seems to be a true type of
agency: a special class invented for non-commercial relationships between occupants of automobiles where the circumstances are such
that the driver is not acting solely as the agent of the passenger, but
the driver and the passenger are acting as mutual agents for each other
with equal right to control the other's conduct in the operation and
management of the automobile 54 and yet no business joint adventure
or partnership exists.
Once the common purpose is found the circumstances that will
tend to establish a right of control are: 1) a substantial sharing of
expenses ;55 2) power to determine the route by mutual agreement;
56 3) agreement to alternate in the driving.5 7 None of the foregoing
are necessarily conclusive.5

The fact that the occupants are related by blood or marriage, 59 or
that they are fellow servants of the same principal 0 does not make
them participants in a joint enterprise.
If the car in which the occupants are riding is owned jointly, this
4935 AM. JUR., Negligence §238 (1941).
50 Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine In Automobile Law, 16 CORNELL

L. Q. 320, at 322 (1931).
51 See note 49 supra.
52 See note 9 supra.
53 For an authority which denies that there is a mutual right of control in a
joint enterprise, see 5 BERRY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES 208 (7th ed. 1935).
54 For a criticism of the element of right of control as applied to the doctrine

55

of joint enterprise in terms of accident prevention, see note 50 supra, at 334;
see also note 38 YALE L. 3. 810, at 812 (1928-29) ; Fleming, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161, at 210 (1954).
RESTATEMENT,

5r Ibid.

57 Prosser,
58 Ibid.

TORTS §491, comment g (1934).

op. cit. supra at 365.

59 Note, 48 MicH. L. REv. 372, 373 (1950).
§491, comment d (1934).

60 RESTATEMENT, TORTS

1957]

COMMENTS

is held to establish the necessary right of control6' and has sometimes
62
been given as the classic example of a joint enterprise.
III. WISCONSIN LAW

The turning point on whether or not a joint enterprise or agency
is found seems to be the element of control. A joint enterprise will
be found when the facts and circumstances establish the necessary
right of control, and yet the situation is such as not to fit adequately into a principal-agent situation and is non-commercial, so as not to
impute negligence on the basis of agency arising from a joint adventure or partnership. It is imperative thaf the Wisconsin cases concerning joint enterprise be analyzed to see what the Court deems necessary
to find the element of control; and then the agency cases must be examined to see if there are any differences to be noted.
A. JOINT ENTERPRISE NOT FOUND:
The first Wisconsin case to discuss joint enterprise was Brubaker
v. Iowa County. 63 Like the majority of cases where joint enterprise is
alleged the defendant pleaded it as an affirmative defense so as to impute the driver's contributory negligence and bar the plaintiff, passenger, from recovery aganist him.64 In that case the plaintiff and her
husband were traveling in the husband's car with the husband driving.
They were changing their place of residence from one city to another.
The car hit a culvert in the road and plaintiff was thrown out of the
car and injured. The Wisconsin Court said that the mere relationship
of husband and wife without more did not establish a joint enterprise."
Since there was no financial undertaking 6 there could be no imputation on the basis of a joint adventure.
In Krause v. Hall," the plaintiff and her boy friend, the defendant,
went to a dance in defendant's automobile. On the way back the defendant in an intoxicated condition crashed the car into a freight train
injuring plaintiff. In a suit by the plaintiff a joint enterprise was alleged, but such an issue was immaterial since the majority rule holds
that a joint enterprise in suits between its members has no effect.6 s
At the time of this case the doctrine was in its earliest stages and
there had been no decision on the question in Wisconsin. More significantly, however, the Court used the following language in denying
the existence of a joint enterprise:
61 Id. at comment f.
62 Fleming, op. cit .supra at 214.
63174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690 (1921).
64Weintraub, op. cit supra at 323.
65 This is the majority view, see note 59 supra.
66 174 Wis. at 578, 183 N.W. at 692.
67195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928).
685 Am. JUR., Automobiles §502 (1939); Note, 13 TEXAS L. REv. 161, at 163
(1935); Berry, op. cit. supra, at 227.
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"The relation of joint adventurers is generally contractual
in its nature. We have been referred to no case in which it
has been held to grow out of social relations.6 9
The Court, in this strictly social relation, failed to make any distinction betwen joint adventure and joint enterprise setting a precedent for future decisions.
This view was further emphasized in Sommerfield v. Flury70
where again a joint enterprise was denied. In that case a threshing
crew was assembled at a farm and a telephone message was received
that there was a fire close by. Krueger, a member of the threshing
crew, jumped into his car to respond to the call for assistance, and
without any invitation the plaintiffs also got into the car for the same
purpose. The car collided with the defendant Flury's truck, and plaintiffs were injured. There was clearly a common purpose here, essential to finding of a joint enterprise, but right of control was lacking.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Sommerfield case, as it indicated in the Krause case, seemed to say that it would find a joint undertaking only where there was a business joint adventure:
"Our attention has been called to a few scattering cases
where courts have considered relations purely social in their nature as giving rise to a joint undertaking. We believe such conclusions were reached without giving due consideration to the
true character of a joint enterprise, as the same is known in the
law. We have said in Krause v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, that the relations of joint adventurers do7 ' not
arise out of social relations.
1
We are still of that opinion.

In the same year as the Sommerfield case the case of Kurz v.
Kuhn72 dismissed the contention of joint enterprise by merely citing
the Sommerfield case and holding the relation that of host and guest.
In 1934 and 1936 joint enterprise was denied in two cases, Hahn v.
Smith, 73 and Canzoneri v. Hecker74 on the same basis and citing the
Somerfield case that joint adventures do not arise out of social situations.7 5 If the Wisconsin Court, by saying that joint adventures do not
usually arise out of social situations, meant also to include the relationship of joint enterprise within the term joint adventures, it would seem
that it would never find the existence of a joint enterprise in a social
situation. But other cases decided by our Supreme Court tend to discuss the orthodox elements for finding joint enterprise. 76
69 195
7o 198
71 Id.
72 198

Wis. at 571, 217 N.W. at 292.
Wis. 163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929).
at 166, 223 N.W. at 410.
Wis. 172, 223 N.W. 412 (1929).
73215 Wis. 277, 254 N.W. 750 (1934).
74 223 Wis. 25, 269 N.W. 716 (1936).
n 215 Wis. at 281, 254 N.W. at 752; 223 Wis. at 30, 269 N.W. at 718.
76 See note 47 supra.

19571

COMMENTS

In Fishback v. Wanta77 the plaintiff and two others were members
of the board of directors of a building and loan association. They
were members of a committee apponited to appraise the value of real
property offered as security. The three usually rode in defendant
Wanta's car, but they were not required to be together while inspecting
or going to the property and were not even required to file a joint report. A collision occured while the three were on such a trip. The
Court denied the existence of a joint enterprise and like the Sommerfield case emphasized the lack of financial interest, but also said that
each was acting individually as an officer of the association and that
their duties and responsibilities were several and not joint. This was
clearly a discussion of the element of a common purpose. The Court
also emphasized that Wanta determined in what order the properties
were to be visited and the route to be taken. If the facts had shown
that the passengers had some voice in these matters it would have
tended to show a mutual right of control. Whether a joint enterprise
would have been found if the three had been required to be together,
giving rise to a common purpose plus the right of each to be heard in
the selection of the route and order of visiting the properties, is purely
a matter of speculation in view of the strong language of the Sommerfield case.
The case of Van Gilder v. GugeT 8 is similar in it facts and decision. The two alleged joint members had each acquired a wood lot
to cut wood for his own use and benifit. On the day of the trip each
was to help the other saw wood in his lot, but neither was to acquire
any interest in the wood of the other. A collision occured on the way
home. The Court said that the car was solely under the driver's control
and the trip did not involve a joint financial interest nor the perfomance of any joint duty even though each had a similar purpose.
These two cases indicate the Wisconsin Court's insistance on the
precedent set down by the Sommerfield case of the necessity of a business relationship. Not only will the right of control necessary to a
joint enterprise be difficult to find unless the relationship is a commercial venture; but even if the passengers have a similar purpose
in occupying the automobile, it will not be enough to establish a
joint enterprise, unless this similar purpose involves a joint undertaking for profit common to both occupants.
Our Court since the Krause case has not drawn any distinction between a joint adventure in the business sense of the term and a joint
enterprise; in discussing the doctrine of joint enterprise in non-business cases it carries over the characteristics of the joint adventure,
and will refuse to find a common purpose or mutual right of control
Wis. 638, 250 N.W1A. 387 (1933).
78220 Wis. 612, 265 N.W. 706 (1936).
77212
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unless there is this business characteristic. This, in effect means that
a joint enterprise in a strictly social situation is rarely, if ever, to be
found in Wisconsin except for the special situation noted later in
the article where the occupants are joint owners of the vehicle.
The confusion which can develop in automobile cases from a failure to differentiate between a trip as a part of a joint adventure and
a joint enterprise is aptly illustrated by Klas v. Fenske7 where the
Court discusses the element of right of control without making it clear
whethei" it refers solely to the automobile trip or to the general relationship of the parties. Gehring, the defendant, was driving and plaintiff,
Klas, was on the right side of the front seat returning from the inspection of a piece of property when the collision occured with defendant Fenske. Fenske pleaded as a defense that Klas and Gehring were
engaged in a joint enterprise. Gehring had procured a real estate
salesman's license under Klas, but he ran his own business and did
not operate as a salesman or employee of Klas. They were associated
only in single transactions. Gehring had an option on a farm and if
Klas purchased it Gehring was to resell it for Klas and to get one half
of any profit made as his commission. The Court denied the existence
of a joint enterprise using languages applicable to a discussion of
joint adventurers:
" . . . . there was no agreement to share the losses. Each
transaction stood upon its own basis and neither party to it had
any authority to bind or control the conduct of the other."
The Court also used language strictly applicable to a finding of
the right of control of the car in a non-business situation:
".....

Gehrung and Klas were not engaged in a joint enter-

prise for the reason that Klas had no control or right of control
over the Gehrung car, under the circumstances of this case."
This case also shows that even if there exists some financial relationship between the parties there is no guarantee that a joint undertaking will be found by our Court.
In a 1953 case, Lind v. Lund 0 and a 1954 case, Schweidler v. Caruso 8 the Court was confronted with two situations involving purely social relations and asked to decide whether a joint enterprise existed.
In the Lind case a nephew who was driving and his aunt who was
a passenger were traveling to Chicago in a car belonging to the driver's
mother. A collision occured and the third party pleaded joint enterprise as a defense. The Court held that no joint enterprise existed,
that the aunt exercised no control over her nephew and also that no
common purpose existed:
79248 Wis. 534, at 544, 22 N.W. 2d 596, at 601 (1945).
80 266 Wis. 232, 63 N.W. 2d 313 (1953).
s8 269 Wis. 438, 69 N.W. 2d 611 (1954).

19571

COMMENTS

"She desired to go to Chicago and so did he, but she was
going for her own purpose in which he had no interest and he
was going for his own purpose in which she had no interest. He
would have gone to Chicago with the automobile, irrespective of
whether or not she became an occupant of the car."'
Even if the two had a common purpose in going to Chicago a
joint enterprise probably would not have been found because of the
Court's insistence of a business purpose common to both.
The Schweidler case, the latest Wisconsin decision to discuss the
doctrine comes the closest in its facts to supplying circumstances
which have been held in other juridictions to supply the necessary
83
right of control.
Schweidler and Earl were on a trip to Canada to go fishing when
the vehicle collided with a car driven by Caruso. The car was owned
by Schweidler. The trip was purely a pleasure trip for the sole
purpose of fishing. There had been no prior arrangement for the
sharing of expenses. Schweidler testified that he did not expect Earl
to pay any car expense. Earl testified that he expected that the expenses would be "Dutch treat." No plans had been made regarding
the driving, but after the trip started they decided to "change off" and
Earl, the non-owner of the car was driving at the time of the collision.
The third party, Caruso, alleged a joint enterprise and cited the Restatement."4 The occupants alternated in the driving but the Court did
not consider this fact as creating a right of control. 85 There was no
prearrangement between the parties for the sharing of expenses, a
fact sometimes held to establish the right of control,8 6 but its absence
was only briefly noted in the opinion. The Court cited the Sommerfield,
Krause, and Van Gilder cases and again held that the relationship of
joint adventurers does not arise out of social relations but grows out
of financial enterprises.87
B. JOINT ENTERPRISE FOUND:
Of the five cases where joint enterprise has been found in Wisconsin the case of Howard v. Riley8 shows that when the automobile
trip is itself a part of a business joint adventure in which the occupants
are engaged the negligence of the driver will be imputed. Here, the
two occupants, husband and wife, were held to be engaged in a joint
adventure in the construction of a motel and the accident occured
82 266 Wis. at 238, 63 N.W. 2d at 316.
83 See notes 55, 56, 57 supra.
RsTATEmENT TORTS §491 (1934).
85 See note 57 supra.
86 See note 55 supra.
87 This is an excellent example of a situation where a new term such as "auto-

84

mobile venture" would be applicable. The use of the term joint adventure
with its business connotation seems totally out of place.

88257 Wis. 594, 44 N.W. 2d 552 (1950).
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while they were in the automobile going to the highway so as to better
observe a portion of the construction of the motel.
The remaining four cases where joint enterprise has been found in
Wisconsin are very similar.
In Archer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co."9 the plaintiff and her
husband, who was driving, were on their way back from a visit to a
married daughter when the accident occurred. The car was owned
jointly by the plaintiff and her husband, and both were designated as
the insured in their liability insurance policy. The evidence showed
that sometimes plaintiff would drive the car for her husband and
at other times he would drive. The Court held that they were engaged in a joint enterprise in that they were involved in an undertaking in which they were jointly interested or in other words a
common purpose, and because they owned the car jointly, there
was a mutual right of control.
In Paine v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co-9° where the
husband and wife were also joint owners of the automobile, the
Court held that the facts were ruled by the Archer case and that a
mutual agency existed requiring the imputation of negligence.
A joint enterprise was held to exist in Emerich v. Bigsby9 ' between
a mother and daughter who jointly owned the car and were returning
to their home from .Appleton where they had been visiting relatives.
The Court held that the facts were ruled by the Archer and Paine
cases. The fact of joint ownership was again held sufficient to supply
the mutual right of control even though the mother could not drive
a car at all.

92

In Johnson v. Pierce93 where the plaintiff and her son were
making a trip to Biloxi, Mississippi to bring home another of plaintiffs' sons and an accident occurred, the Wisconsin Court held, relying
on the earlier cases, 94 that the joint ownership of the automobile supplied the necessary right of control and that they were engaged in
a joint enterprise as a matter of law.95
It is to be noted that where a joint ownership of the automobile
is present a mutual right of control is established solely because of the
joint ownership; a common purpose of a financial, commercial nature
is not required by the Court. This is in direct contrast to the non215 Wis. 509, 255 N.W. 67 (1934).
90217 Wis. 601, 258 N.W. 846 (1935).
91 231 Wis. 473, 286 N.W. 51 (1939).
92 The court said the fact that the mother could not drive made the agency of
the daughter more apparent. However, joint enterprise is said to be a mutual
agency. The agency of the mother for the daughter is difficult to find.
93 262 Wis. 367, 55 N.W. 2d 394 (1952).
94 See notes 89, 90, 91 supra.
95 The court used the term joint adventure rather than joint enterprise. This is
another case where a new term to describe only a social situation would be
desirable.
89
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ownership cases where its absence is fatal to the establishment of a
joint enterprise.
An interesting comparison can be made between the four Wisconsin
cases where joint enterprise was predicted upon the joint ownership
of the car and the case of Fox v. Kaminsky" where the wife owned
the car but her husband kept up the payments and habitually used the
car. On the day of the collision the husband was driving the car and
invited his wife to take a trip to a lake to see whether conditions were
favorable for duck hunting. The Court held that the wife was a
guest in her own automobile; that there was no common purpose because the husband took the trip for an enterprise of his own and
that he had full control of the route, directions and all details of the
trip. If the car had been owned jointly or even registered in both
names the probability is great that the result would be different in view
of the Archer,97 Paine,98 Emnerich,99 and Johnson"0 cases.

IV. WISCONSIN CASES ON AGENCY BETWEEN OCCUPANTS
As was stated earlier joint enterprise is a type of agency; a right
of control is essential to each. Several cases discuss both relationships. 1 1 Since a joint ownership is held to establish a joint enterprise
the question arises as to the effect ownership of the car will have in
establishing an agency where the owner is present in the car as a
passenger.
The Reiter case102 involved a son as driver and his father and
brother as passengers. There was much evidence as to the ownership
of the car but it was decided that the driver and not his father was
the owner. The Court stated however, that even if the father was the
owner, a man could be a guest in his own automobile and under the
circumstances of the case he would have to be classed as a guest.
Generally the owner's presence in his car while being driven by
another gives rise to an inference that it was being driven by his agent
and that he has a right of control over its operation. 0 3 This inference
varies, being strongest when it is operated by a member of his family.' 0 '
Wisconsin has held that ownership of a car is prima facie evidence that
the driver is acting as the owner's agent in driving it.105 But unlike

the joint ownership which seems to conclusively establish a joint enter239 Wis. 559, 2 N.W. 2d 199 (1942).
See note 89 supra.
98 See note 90 supra.
09 See note 91 supra.
100 See note 93 supra.
101 See notes 73, 80 supra.
102 See note 4 supra.
' 0 3 Annot., 2 A.L.R. 888 (1919).
104 Annot., 80 A.L.R. 288 (1932).
105 Enea v. Pfister, 180 Wis. 329, 192 N.W. 1018 (1923); Edward v. Kohn, 207
Wis. 381, 241 N.W. 331 (1922).
96
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prise in Wisconsin, the fact of ownership creates only a rebuttle presumption of agency which will disappear if evidence to the contrary
is presented.'0 6
In two Wisconsin cases, Wilcott v. Ley 1°7 and Schmidt v. Leary'05
an agency was found on the basis of ownership of the car by the passenger, and resulted in the driver's negligence being imputed to the
passenger barring his recovery as plaintiff against a negligent third
party.
In the Wilcott case the plaintiff and his wife were returning from
a dance in plaintiff's car. His wife was driving at his request when the
collision occurred injuring plaintiff. The Court held there was an
agency imputing the wife's negligence to her husband because of his
ownership of the car and the rendering of a service beneficial to him.
The Schmidt case involved a plaintiff wife's car which was being
driven by her husband on a trip to visit friends. The Court held an
agency existed requiring the husband's negligence to be imputed to
the wife because of her ownership of the car which was purchased for
use in her business, and because at the time it was being used for her
pleasure.
These two cases found the necessary right of control in the ownership of the car along with the benefit to the principal 10 to find an
agency and impute the negligence where the passenger was the plaintiff.
Four cases; Gehloff v. Kandler,"0 Sevey v. Jones,"' Powel v. Ginsberg,112 and Lott v. Grant;"3 found an agency and imputed the negli-

gence to the owner-passenger to make him vicariously liable as defendant in a suit by a third party.
In the Gehloff case the defendant, who was unable to drive, borrowed her son's car and asked her friend, Mrs. De Marce, to drive
her. Defendant owned a car but her son was using it at the time and
she borrowed his. Through Mrs. De Marce's negligence plaintiffs
were injured and defendant sought to avoid liability. The Court found
an agency: ownership of the car created a prima facie case,"" Mrs.
De Marce drove at defendant's request, in her interest, and subject to
her right of control and direction.
The Sevey case involved a man and woman who had been "keeping
100 Zurn v. Whatley, 213 Wis. 365, at 370, 251 N.W. 435, at 440 (1933).
207205 Wis. 155, 236 N.W. 593 (1931).
los 213 Wis. 587, 252 N.W. 151 (1934).
109 See note 9 supra.
110 204 Wis. 464, 234 N.W. 717 (1931).
"'1235 Wis. 109, 292 N.W. 436 (1943).
112 245 Wis. 45, 13 N.W. 2d 448 (1944).
113 198 Wis. 291, 223 N.W. 2d 846 (1929).
114Technically the defendant was not the owner of the car here since she had
lent her car to her son and borrowed his.
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company." The man frequently took his girl for rides. On the trip in
question, she took over driving after a time to gain some experience
so as to get a driver's license and a collision occured. The Court
held there was some element of mutual pleasure present and that he
exercised the right of control over her. It is questionable as to how
much benefit the defendant actually received by her driving, but the
Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the evidence was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of agency established by his ownership.
The defendant in the Powels case went in his car, with his brother,
to a restaurant where he was to meet his wife. The brother asked to
drive because the car was new and he wanted to see how it handled.
When they arrived at their destination the brother opened the door on
the left side hitting plaintiff who was passing on his bicycle. Defendant was held vicariously liable because he had control in determining
when and where the car should be driven and the purpose of the trip
remained his.
These cases, with the exception of Lott v. Grant, which involved
a prospective buyer of a car taking a demonstration ride with the
owner, a second band auto dealer, were strictly non-business and gratuitous, as were the two cases where agency was imputed as plaintiff.
All these cases which found an agency in non-commercial social situations are to be compared and contrasted to the language used in the
case of Hynek v. M1ilwvaukee Automobile Insurance Co.115 where the
court said that agency should be usually limited to business situations:
"While the Flury case, involved the element of joint enterprise, it bears strongly upon the question of gratuitous agency
because the relationship arising out of a joint enterprise that
would operate to impute the negligence of one enterpriser to
his associates would necessarily be grounded upon principles of
agency. If joint enterprises do not frequently or ever arise out
of purely social relationships, neither do relationships of agency
ordinarily so arise. 116
In two other Wisconsin cases, Hahn v. Smith 1 7 and Smafly V.
Simkins,"8 where agency was alleged and the owner was a passenger
in the car, agency was not found.
The Hahn case involved an owner and driver of the car who were
father and son respectively. The father had loaned the car to his son
so that he could pick up his stepson who had been visiting a few days
on a farm. The Court held that there was no agency requiring the son's
negligence to be imputed to the father making him vicariously liable
115

243 Wis. 591, 11 N.W. 2d 352 (1943).

117

See note 73 supra.

116 Id. at 595, 11 N.W. 2d at 354.

I's 194 Wis. 12, 215 N.W. 450 (1927).
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because the trip was not taken for any purpose or business of the
father, so there was no benefit to him_)19
The Smally case is very similar in its facts to Schweidler
v. Caruso120 although it discusses only agency and not joint enterprise.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Smally, her husband the defendant Frank Smally,
and Simkins, the owner of the car were friends and drove to Chicago
together in Simkin's car. Each of the men were to alternate in the
driving and at the time of the collision Smally was driving; Simkins,
the owner, was riding in the front seat. Mrs. Simkins sued both her
husband and Simkins. The Court held that no agency existed between
the two defendants requiring Mr. Smally's negligence to be imputed
to Simkins making him vicariously liable. The Court further held that
the fact of ownership of the car by Simkins was not sufficient to create
liability.
122
12 1
Renich v. Klein,
In four Wisconsin cases; Bennet v. Nebel,
4
Hynek v. Milwaukee Auto Insurance Co., 123 and Lind v. Lund;"
where agency was considered between occupants of automobiles in
social situations, ownership of the car was not an issue, and all four
cases failed to find an agency because of the lack of right of control
by the alleged principal.
The issue of imputed negligence in the Bennet case was a minor
one. The Court by obiter dicta did state, pursuant to the facts of the
case, that because a passenger requests the driver to go to a certain
destination, even indicating the route, it is not enough to warrant imputing the negligence of the driver to the passenger.
An unusual fact situation was involved in the Renich case. Flentz.
a boy of nineteen, was in the cab of a truck waiting for his employer
who had gone into a store soliciting business, when Giesing, an old man,
without invitation, entered and asked to be driven to the corner to
catch a bus. Flentz did this, but the bus left before he could reach it.
He continued after it for about half a mile but then decided to quit
and told Giesing who said nothing. Then the truck skidded, hit'plaintiff's car and Giesing was killed. The plaintiffs alleged agency in
order to impute Flentz's negligence to Giesing holding his estate vicaroiusly liable. The Court reversed the trial court and held that Giesing
had no right of control over Flentz, that the relation was that of host
219 Note that agency and joint enterprise may be pleaded in the same case. The
Hahn case found neither. See Fox v. Kaninsky, note 96 supra, where the
wife was the owner-passenger. Only joint enterprise was alleged. Even if
agency had been pleaded, it seems likely that the clear benefit to the husband would have rebutted the presumption of agency arising from the wife's
ownership.
120 See note 81 supra.
121 199 Wis. 334, 226 N.W. 395 (1929).
122230 Wis. 123, 283 N.W. 288 (1939).
12 See note 115 supra.
124 See note 80 supra.
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and guest, and that Flentz's act was only an act of friendly courtesy.
The fact that Giesing requested the courtesy was considered of no
great importance.
The fact that agency was attempted here for purposes of liability
instead of defense may have influenced the Court in denying an
agency since courts are reluctant to find an agency where there
is an attempt to impose liability.

25

Our Court however, has not had

any hesitancy in holding a passenger liable by agency where he was
the owner of the vehicle.

126

In the Hynek case, the defendant, Degener, called at plaintiffHynek's, home to get his wife who was visiting there. Hynek told
Degener that his father had died and he was going to a friend's home
to borrow his automobile. Degener volunteered to drive him there and
a collision occured shortly after. The Court classed the case with the
Flury12 7 and Renich cases, that this was a mere social courtesy.
The Lind case discussed earlier,'2 S which refused to find a joint
enterprise, also refused an agency because of lack of right of control.
In only one case, Georgeson v. Nielson,2 9 where ownership of the
car was not a factor, has agency been found between occupants of an
automobile resulting in imputing of negligence. In that case, the plaintiff, Georgeson, had borrowed a trailer for the purpose of transporting
cattle. Plaintiff did not have a hitch on his car to attach it, so Dennis
offered to pull the trailer with his car. On the way back, a collision
occurred. Dennis's negligence was imputed to Georgeson barring his
recovery. The Court held that there was the necessary benefit to Georgeson,' and while Dennis was transporting the cattle he was subject to
his control.
The Court felt this was more like a business relationship than a
situation where an ordinary social courtesy is offered,130 but whether
a trip to transport cows is more of a business transaction than taking
someone to a bus stop, as in the Renich case, or to a friend's house,
1 31

as in the Hynek case, is debatable.'

The Georgeson case was undoubtedly applying the business relationship emphasis running throughout the Wisconsin decisions, but its
result does seem out of line when compared factually with the other
cases. 1 32 The fact that the Renich case was an attempt to impose lia125 Morris, supra,note 3, at 138.

See notes 110, 111, 112, 113 supra.
See note 70 supra.
128 See note 80 supra.
129 214 Wis. 191, 252 N.W. 576 (1934).
'130 See Hynek case, 243 Wis. at 596, for a discussion of this point.
131 Morris, supra note 3, at 140.
232 Compare especially with Klas v. Fenske, 248 Wis. 534, 22 N.W. 2d. 596 (1945),
where a business relationship was held insufficient to establish a joint enterprise even though one was to resell a piece of property for another at a
commission.
'26
127
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bility may have influenced the Court in denying an agency and can
possibly be distinguished from the Georgeson case on that ground ;133
but in the Hynek case agency was pleaded as a defense like the Georgeson case, and whether the facts in the two cases are so dissimilar so
as to class one as a business relation and one as only a social courtesy
is questionable.
The high standard of business relationship necessary to the establishment of a joint enterprise in Wisconsin is in contrast to the
Georgeson case. The cases where joint enterprise was denied might
have found agency if it had been alleged, since the test of a business
relation necessary to find the right of control appears less stringently
applied in agency cases in view of the Georqeson case."
V.

A.

SUMMARY

JOINT ENTERPRISE:

1) It appears that if an automobile trip is a part of a general business relationship between the occupants, either a partnership or joint
adventure, negligence of the driver will be imputed in suits between
an occupant and third parties and called either joint enterprise or joint
adventure by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
2) If no commercial relationship exists between the occupants and
there is no joint ownership, it is doubtful if out Court will ever establish a joint enterprise.
3) The Wisconsin Court insists on a business common purpose;
that is, a joint financial undertaking to find the mutual right of control
to establish a joint enterprise; a social common purpose is insufficient.
The exact nature of this business relationship which will be held adequate to establish a joint enterprise is not made clear by the decisions.
Any commercial adventure is not sufficient; it must approach or even
be a joint adventure. As yet no Wisconsin case has reached this standard.
4) While other jurisdictions have retreated from establishing a
joint enterprise on the technical joint ownership of the automobile,' 35
Wisconsin will substitute this element for the presence of a business
relationship as establishing a right of control and has found a joint
enterprise solely on this basis. If it is sound to limit the doctrine of imputed negligence to business relationships where it is somewhat expected and can be insured against as the Wisconsin Court has done, it
seems a harsh rule to establish an identical result on the basis of tech133 The Georgeson case was argued by counsel in

even mentioned in the opinion.

the Renich case, but it was not

134 Compare the Georgeson case with Van Gilder v. Gugel, see note 78 supra,
where joint enterprise was denied. Agency might have been pleaded successfully.
135 Fleming, supra note 54, at 213.
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nical ownership of the car in a social situation to bar an innocent passenger from recovering for his injuries.
B. AGENCY:

1) Where Passenger is Owner:
a) Ownership of the car by the passenger in the establishment of
an agency is not conclusive as mutual ownership seems to be in the
joint enterprise cases. It is a strong fact to arrive at the necessary
right of control and establishes a prima facie case of agency in Wisconsin. If it can be shown that the trip was not beneficial to the ownerpasseflger or if other facts rebut the inference of control arising from
ownership, agency will be denied by the Court.
b) Whether agency is pleaded as a defense or to hold the passenger vicariously liable in this type of case seems to have little influence
in deciding whether an agency exists or not.
2) Where Ownership Is Not a Factor:
a) A mere request by the passenger to go to a certain destination
without more, is not enough to establish an agency in Wisconsin.
b) The absence of ownership by the passenger shifts the Court's
emphasis back to a business relationship to find the necessary right
of control. Whether any given case is classed as a mere social courtesy
or a business relationship giving rise to agency depends on the facts.
The tendency does seem more toward the denial of agency than its
establishment since only the Georgeson case was found to have the
necessary business relationship.
c) Whether the Wisconsin Court is influenced by the fact that
agency is pleaded for the purpose of holding the passenger vicariously
liable rather than for purposes of defense by the third party is not
clear. Only one case, Renich v. Klein, has been decided in Wisconsin
where agency was attempted to hold the non-owner passenger vicariously liable. Whether this fact influenced the Court to deny agency
is debatable. The Court may have disregarded this and merely felt
that the facts fell into the social category rather than a business relationship.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Wisconsin Court has been fairly consistent in its discussion
of joint enterprise whether or not one agrees with its restricted view
of the elements necessary for its existence. Where Wisconsin law is
applicable, attorneys should be able to predict with some degree of
accuracy the outcome of their joint enterprise cases.
To adequately predict the outcome of an agency case presents a
more difficult problem. The state of the law now is highly inconsistent. It is hoped that this review of the decided cases and conclusions
drawn from them will be of some assistance.
MICHAEL J. PELTIN

